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Full versus Partial Delegation  
in Multi-Task Agency 
 
Abstract:  
We consider a moral hazard type agency problem. Two tasks need to be performed within 
the agency. The principal can either delegate both tasks to the agent or perform one of the 
tasks himself. In the latter case the principal can choose which task to delegate but doing 
both personally is not feasible. 
As firm value is not contractible by assumption the incentive contract offered to the agent 
needs to be based on a possibly non-congruent performance measure. Allowing for both of 
the players to be risk averse, agency costs can arise from a trade-off in allocating incentives 
and risk as well as from a congruity problem. 
While full delegation results in a standard two task agency problem, partial delegation 
creates a double moral hazard problem as neither the principal can observe the agent’s 
effort nor vice versa. We find that full delegation is more favorable the more risk is optimally 
allocated to the agent. Accordingly partial delegation is beneficial if the principal has a 
relatively low degree of risk aversion. Moreover, full delegation allows the principal to scale 
incentives provided to the agent but not to fine tune the intensity of incentives for each 
effort separately. With partial delegation fine tuning is possible but increasing incentives for 
one effort implies reducing them for the other. If scaling is more effective in minimizing 
agency costs than fine tuning incentives, the principal tends to prefer full delegation to 
partial delegation and vice versa.  
 
Keywords: Delegation, agency problem, congruity, risk sharing  
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I. Introduction 
Most of the literature on principal-agent relationships assumes somewhat exogenously that 
the principal delegates one or several tasks to an agent as he is unable to perform any task 
himself. A compelling example to justify this assumption is a corporation with vastly 
diversified ownership. Its shareholders are typically unable to manage the firm’s daily 
business themselves and need to delegate these tasks to one or several professional 
manager(s). 
The necessity for complete delegation, however, is likely to be absent in other business 
environments. E.g. an owner-manager of a firm may be forced due to limited time to 
delegate tasks or decision rights to subordinates. However, the degree of delegation as well 
as the specific tasks to be delegated are subject to some discretion. The same reasoning is 
likely to apply to principal-agent relationships on lower hierarchical levels. Even in a 
corporation of the type described in the first paragraph, e.g. a division manager exhibits 
discretion when deciding whether or not to delegate a task, and which particular tasks to 
delegate, to subordinated managers or employees. 
In this paper we focus on the latter type of settings. Delegation is inevitable but its degree 
and specifics are subject to managerial choice. In particular we consider a linear moral 
hazard type agency model. Two tasks need to be performed. A manager (principal) is unable 
to perform both tasks personally. He employs an agent and decides whether to delegate 
both tasks to the agent or only one. We allow for both, the principal and the agent, to be risk 
averse in our analysis. The principal maximizes firm value, but firm value is non-contractible 
in our setting. Rather, a performance measure that is positively correlated with firm value is 
available for contracting in order to incentivize the agent. While firm value and the 
performance measure are assumed to be increasing in effort, performance sensitivities of 
both measures may differ for each task. Accordingly, the owner’s objectives are potentially 
captured only imperfectly by the performance signal. This creates a setting in which a risk 
and incentive trade-off and a congruity problem are present simultaneously. We study the 
effect of both types of agency problems on the delegation choice. 
The optimal compensation contract prescribes the delegation mode along with the payment 
parameters. Technically, we proceed in two steps. We determine the optimal contracting 
parameters for each delegation mode. Comparing the principal’s surplus in each mode 
determines the optimal delegation scenario. We distinguish three delegation modes. Under 
full delegation both tasks are delegated to the agent. Under partial delegation either task 1 
or task 2 is delegated to the agent and the remaining action will be performed by the 
manager himself.  Note that with partial delegation we face a double moral hazard problem. 
Due to unobservability of effort, both, the agent and the principal, are unable to commit to a 
specific effort ex ante. An incentive compatibility constraint needs to be specified not only 
for the agent but for the principal. Importantly, the principal chooses effort trading off an 
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increase in firm value and the disutility from effort as well as compensation costs. The latter 
results from the fact, that additional effort not only increases expected firm value, but also 
expected value of the performance measure determining the payment to the agent. Of 
course the increase in expected compensation is stronger, the higher the incentive rate 
agreed upon in the contract. A higher incentive rate thus decreases equilibrium effort of the 
principal.  
Having determined the optimal contract parameters and payoffs in each delegation mode 
we continue investigating the risk-incentive problem separately from the congruity problem 
in a ceteris paribus analysis. To do so we assume a fully congruent performance measure in 
the first step. Given the risk incentive trade-off is the only rub, we find that full delegation is 
preferred if the agent’s optimal exposure to risk is high while partial delegation is optimal if 
this exposure is low. Intuitively, with full delegation the principal motivates both efforts to 
be performed by the agent using a single incentive rate. With partial delegation he motivates 
only one effort and, moreover, limits the equilibrium effort for his own task by determining 
the incentive rate. As a result the optimal incentive rate with full delegation is always higher 
than with partial delegation. From a risk sharing perspective, however, a high incentive rate 
is beneficial only if most of the risk should be allocated to the agent. Otherwise a low rate 
would be preferred. As a result full delegation becomes more favorable, the lower the 
agent’s risk aversion relative to the principal’s 
In the second step we focus purely on the congruity issue assuming two risk neutral players. 
If the signal is not fully congruent, partial delegation may become optimal. The optimal 
choice of the delegation mode follows a trade-off between scaling and alignment of 
incentives. With full delegation the principal can increase or decrease incentives by adapting 
the incentive rate but cannot affect the relative size of both efforts. In contrast, under partial 
delegation additional effort with respect to one task can be motivated at the expense of the 
other task. Precisely, increasing the incentive coefficient for the agent increases the effort in 
the delegated task but at the same time decreases the equilibrium effort in the task 
performed by the principal as described above. Whether full or partial delegation is optimal 
depends on whether scaling or alignment of incentives is more efficient in approaching first 
best. Intuitively, the ability to scale efforts is helpful if the sensitivity of the performance 
measure with regard to both tasks is either too high or too low. In contrast the ability to 
align incentives is helpful if the sensitivity of the performance measure is too high for one 
task and too low for the other as compared to the effect the tasks have on firm value. 
Our paper is closely related to Itoh (1994) and may be considered an extension of his work. 
Similar to our scenario, Itoh considers a setting where either two tasks or one task can be 
delegated to an agent. However, he employs a risk neutral principal and a risk averse agent. 
The principal in his model maximizes firm value, which at the same time is used as the 
performance measure in the agent’s incentive contract. Further, in Itoh (1994) both tasks are 
equally productive such that the principal is indifferent which one to delegate. As a 
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consequence the risk and incentive trade-off in Itoh (1994) is different from ours. More 
importantly, a congruity problem in his paper does not arise nor does the question of which 
task to delegate most effectively. 
A comparison of the impact of full versus partial delegation is also carried out in De 
Paola/Scoppa (2009). Using a two-task agency with risk neutral principal and agent under 
limited liability, they allow for the principal and the agent to have different abilities and 
assume that transmission costs exist. In contrast to our paper, the principal always performs 
the first task in their model and transmits its outcome to the agent to perform the second 
task.  
Finally, Gürtler (2008) analyzes partial delegation in a somewhat related paper. He considers, 
however, relational contracts rather than explicit (formal) incentive contracts used in this 
paper. 
Moreover, our paper ties in with at least three more streams in the literature. First, it is 
related to the literature investigating the interplay between performance measure congruity 
and the risk and incentive trade-off. Second, it is related to papers analyzing the value of 
delegation as such. Third, our paper connects with the literature on optimal task assignment 
in agency conflicts.  
Seminal papers belonging to the first stream of literature mentioned above are 
Holmström/Milgrom (1991) and Feltham/Xie (1994). Both analyze frictions that occur in 
multi-task agency, if the agent’s contribution to firm value is not contractible. In this context 
the papers by Datar et al. (2001) and Baker (2002) specifically analyze how performance 
measure risk and (lack off) congruity are traded-off in optimal incentive contracts. Similar to 
these papers, we assume that firm value is not contractible and a risk averse agent has to be 
motivated by a (potentially non congruent) performance signal. While in those papers 
optimal incentive weights are determined by the performance measure risk and its 
congruity, firm value risk is of additional relevance in our paper. This results from allowing 
for the principal to be risk averse. The main difference, however, between the afore 
mentioned papers and our approach is, that they exogenously assume full delegation of a 
given number of tasks while in our model the principal may perform one task himself and 
the number of tasks delegated is endogenous. 
Referring to the second stream of literature, different explanations for a positive value of 
delegation, or a benefit from decentralization, have been offered. E.g. in 
Melumad/Reichelstein (1987) costly communication can render delegation beneficial. 
Melumad/Mookherjee (1989) and Schöndube-Pirchegger/Schöndube (2012) show that the 
delegation of decision rights may act as a commitment device. In this paper neither a 
communication nor a commitment problem are present. Rather, the optimal delegation 
mode trades-off risk sharing and the congruity of the performance measure with firm value. 
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In Bushman et al. (2000) delegation may be optimal as the agent receives pre-decision 
information in a decentralized system. They show that the value of delegation is positive if 
the congruence of the performance measure exceeds a threshold that depends on the 
agent’s risk aversion. Important differences from our paper are threefold: First, we do not 
consider pre-decision information. Second, in Bushman et al. delegation results in non- 
observability of the agent’s effort while in our approach effort is always unobservable but 
the principal can perform one task himself. Third, in Bushman et al. the principal has to 
motivate the effort in one task across different states of the world while we consider a 
setting where the principal has to control the effort to be devoted to two different tasks. 
Finally, with respect to the task assignment literature, our paper is related to some extent to 
Zhang (2003) and Hughes et al. (2005). In a model in which a principal can assign tasks to 
two identical agents, Zhang compares specialized and broad task assignment when tasks are 
complementary and Hughes et al. investigate optimal task assignment when the payoff from 
production is not contractible such that the congruity of performance signals matters. 
Reichmann/Rohlfing-Bastian (2014) consider a setting where the principal delegates the task 
assignment decision to one of two agents. Schöttner (2008) analyzes the task assignment 
problem under relational contracts.  Again, all these papers differ from our setting as they 
assume that all tasks have to be delegated to agents while in our model partial delegation is 
feasible. 
 
II. Model description 
We consider a single period LEN-type principal-agent model. Two tasks need to be 
performed. 
The manager/principal can delegate both tasks to the agent. Alternatively he can perform 
the first or the second task himself. For exogenous reasons, e.g. time constraints, it is 
impossible for the principal to perform both tasks on his own. In other words some 
delegation is inevitable in our setting while full delegation is possible. All effort is privately 
observed by the performing party.  
The effort in both tasks    	,   affects long run firm value 
 as follows  
 
       
    is the contribution per unit of effort in task  to the firm value, we call it task ’s 
productivity. We assume that 
 is non verifiable and therefore not available for incentive 
contracting. Rather, principal and agent can contract on a performance measure  that is 
affected by both tasks 
        
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   is the contribution per unit of effort in task  to the performance measure, we call it 
task ’s sensitivity.  and  are (jointly) normally distributed , with   
  We 
assume that firm value and performance measure are positively correlated with  ! "  #  and correlation coefficient between  
 and  # $ %. 
Performing a task creates identical disutilities no matter whether the principal or the agent 
provides the effort: 
  &'(  for   	 
We restrict ourselves to linear incentive contracts of the form )  *    
where * determines a fixed compensation and   an incentive rate that relates the agent’s 
compensation to performance measure  
Both, the agent and the principal might be risk averse. Risk aversion parameters are denoted +,  and +-  for agent and principal, respectively. Given our LEN-setup the certainty 
equivalents of both players are given by 
 
./  .!)" 0 1 0 1 0 +,	 23+) 
and 
.4  .
 0 .!)" 0  0 1 0  0 1 0 56 23+
 0 )). 
 
Here CEA denotes the agent’s and CEP the principal’s certainty equivalent. 1 $ 78 with   	 is equal to one if the task is delegated to the agent and zero if the principal acts 
himself. The agent’s certainty equivalent of reservation utility is normalized to zero without 
loss of generality. 
Note that the principal offers a contract to the agent that specifies which task(s) to be 
performed by the agent along with the agent’s compensation. Thus delegation and control 
choices are made simultaneously at the beginning of the game. The agent either accepts the 
contract or refuses to do so and the game ends. If the agent accepts, he performs all the 
tasks delegated to him according to the contract. Once  is realized the agent is paid. 
In our multi task setting with risk averse players agency costs occur due to two types of 
overlapping effects. For once agency costs arise due to possibly suboptimal risk sharing 
between principal and agent when the principal needs to trade off risk and incentives. The 
other type of agency costs results from a lack of congruity of the performance measure 
available. Costs here are related to suboptimal allocation of effort to both tasks. Both 
combined effects are relevant with respect to the optimal degree of delegation.  
In the next section we determine the first best (symmetric information) solution to our 
problem to provide a benchmark. Section IV contains second best solutions for each 
delegation mode. The results are analyzed in detail in sections V and VI.  
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III. First best solution 
 
If asymmetric information with regard to effort is absent it does not matter how many tasks 
are delegated given that principal and agent perform both tasks at identical costs. All that is 
necessary to achieve first best is a forcing contract specifying the effort level for each task 
and the player to perform the effort. We randomly assume below that both tasks are 
delegated to the agent resulting in the following optimization problem.  
9:;&<&(=> .4  .
 0 .!)" 0 56 23+!
 0 )"(1) 
            s.t.                                                                                                                       
.!)" 0  0  0 5? 23+!)" @                           (2) 
 
(2) is the participation constraint for the agent. By inserting the binding participation 
constraint, (1) reduces to  
 
9:;&<&(= A  .
 0  0  0 5? 23+!)" 0 56 23+
 0 ) .     (3) 
 A is the net surplus of the agency. It comprises the benefits .
  less the cost to generate 
the benefits. 
 
Solutions to the above problem are presented in lemma 1. 
 
Lemma 1: The optimal effort levels in the first-best solution are  BC   and  BC   
The optimal incentive rate equals  BC  56DEFEGEG(5?H56 and the principal’s surplus is ABC !56H5?"!I<(HI(("J56EF(!JD("J565?EF(56H5? . 
 
Proof. See the Appendix.  
 
As argued above, delegation of only one task would result in identical incentive rate and 
payoff to the principal. Note that in the first best setting the incentive rate is determined in 
order to allocate risk between principal and agent optimally. In other words it minimizes the 
risk premium the principal has to bear in equilibrium, which is  
K4  5? 23+!)"  56 23+!
 0 )"  5?    56     0 	# . 
 
As 
 and  are positively correlated the incentive rate is always positive. It can be either 
below or above one. It is increasing in the principal’s risk aversion +- and becomes zero if 
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the principal is risk neutral. With the first best solution in place we continue analyzing 
second best.  
 
IV. Second-best solutions 
 
Full delegation 
If the principal decides to delegate both tasks to the agent a standard multi-task agency 
problem with linear contracts is present, see, e.g., Feltham/Xie (1994). For a given incentive 
coefficient   the agent selects his effort as         .                                  (4) 
 
To determine the optimal contract the principal maximizes (3) subject to the incentive 
compatibility constraints in (4).  
 
Lemma 2: The optimal bonus coefficient under full delegation is  
 L      +-#    +-  +,  
The principal’s corresponding surplus is  
AL   I(M(!I<M<H56DEFEG"HI<(M<(HI((M((J!M<(HM(("56EF(HM<I<56DEFEGJEF(EG(N56"(!JD("H5?56%M<(HM((HEG(56H5?   
 
Proof: See the Appendix.  
Partial delegation 
If the principal delegates only one task to the agent and performs the other one himself, 
incentives change. As we assume that the principal cannot commit to a specific effort ex 
ante, we face a double moral hazard problem with partial delegation. Thus, we have to 
consider an incentive compatibility constraint for the principal, too.  If the principal decides 
to delegate task   to the agent and performs task O    himself   $ 7	8 , P 0  the 
incentive compatibility constraint for the agent applies as before  
                                           (5) 
 
The incentive compatibility constraint for the principal equals  
 J  J 0  J                     (6) 
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The principal’s incentive compatibility constraint is derived from maximizing his certainty 
equivalent CEP as defined in section II with respect to J. Note that the principal chooses 
effort trading off the marginal increase in firm value, J, and marginal cost in terms of 
marginal expected compensation to the agent,   J. Thus whenever the principal performs 
some effort personally, his effort not only increases expected firm value, but also expected 
compensation paid to the agent. The latter constitutes a cost related to effort in addition to 
disutility J 
 
As the agent’s participation constraint is binding at the optimum, independently of the 
delegation mode the principal’s objective function to determine incentive contracts is always 
given by (3). 
Thus, under partial delegation the principal maximizes (3) subject to the incentive 
constraints (5) and (6). The solution to the problem is stated in Lemma 3. 
 
Lemma 3: Under partial delegation, if task  is delegated to the agent, the optimal incentive 
coefficient is  
 Q    #+-    +-  +, 
The principal’s corresponding surplus is given by  
AQ  	 
N  +,  +-R     0   +-  	+-# 0 S+- 0 #  +,+-%    +-  +,  
 
Proof: See the Appendix. 
 
Comparison of the results 
 
Opposing the results from above we find that full delegation induces higher incentive rates 
as is stated below. 
Lemma 4: The optimal incentive coefficient with full delegation is always strictly higher than 
with partial delegation.  
 
Proof. From Lemma 2 and Lemma 3 we know that  
 Q  M'I'HD56EFEGM<(HM((HEG(56H5? and  L  M<I<HM(I(HD56EFEGM<(HM((HEG(56H5?   such that  L 0  Q  MT'IT'M<(HM((HEG(!56H5?"  . 
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The intuition for this result is straightforward. With full delegation an increase in   increases 
the agent’s incentives to perform both efforts. In contrast with partial delegation higher   
increases the agent’s incentive to perform the delegated task but at the same time reduces 
the equilibrium effort of the principal as is observed from (6). As a consequence increasing   
is more effective in terms of effort motivation with full delegation than with partial 
delegation and the optimal incentive rate is always higher with full delegation. 
Calculating the difference in objective function values our results are less clear cut. 
AL 0 AQ  		JJ!  +
-#" 0 J   +,  +-    +,  +-  
can be either positive or negative depending on parameter values. Full delegation is optimal 
in some settings and partial delegation in others. Optimality is affected simultaneously by 
the risk-incentive trade-off and the congruity problem present. In what follows we 
disentangle both types of agency problems and analyze them separately. We start in section 
V focusing on the risk and incentive trade-off. In section VI we investigate the effects of the 
congruity problem.  
 
V. Delegation and contracting choices with risk averse players 
In order to concentrate on the risk and incentive trade-off we assume that there is no 
congruity problem present in this section. To achieve this we set    and       
Referring to Itoh (1994) once again, note that perfect congruity is present in his model as 
well but he assumes       in addition. Doing so implies that partial delegation of task 
1 and task 2 yields the same equilibrium outcome which is not the case in our analysis. 
Moreover, Itoh assumed contractibility of firm value and an absence of an additional 
performance measure. Accordingly in his setting firm value 
 is the only variable exposing 
the players to risk while in our paper the risk jointly induced by 
 and  turns out to be 
important.  
Applying     and    to the optimal incentive rates for full and partial delegation 
(Lemma 2 and 3) we obtain  
 
 L  I<(HI((H56DEFEGI<(HI((HEG(56H5?    (7) 
and 
                                                            
1 The performance measure is congruent only if M<M(  I<I(, see Feltham/Xie (1994). 
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 Q  I'(HD56EFEGI<(HI((HEG(56H5?   (8) 
Also, recall from Lemma 1 that the first best incentive rate equals  
 BC  56DEFEGEG(5?H56 .     (9) 
 BC is unaffected by the now assumed absence of a congruity problem and, as stated above, 
minimizes the overall risk premium to be borne by the principal. Low (high)  BC  is 
tantamount to optimally allocating most of the risk to the principal (agent).   
While  BC is either below or above one, it follows from (7), (9), and Lemma 4 that whenever  BC  , it holds that   Q U  L U  BC. Thus, if   BC is sufficiently high, the optimal incentive 
rate is closer to the optimal risk allocation rate with full delegation than with partial 
delegation. Distortion from the optimal risk allocation therefore is lower with full delegation.  
On the other hand  BC U  Q U  L  from (9), (8), and again Lemma 4 requires   BC U .2 
Thus, for the distortion from first best risk allocation to be lower with partial delegation than 
with full delegation   BC has to be sufficiently low. With these observations in place we 
continue contrasting full and partial delegation.  
Calculating the payoff differences for the modes of delegation we obtain 
AL 0 AQ   IT'( !I'(HV"I<(HI((H5?H56EG(  (10) 
and 
AQ 0 AJQ   V!I'(JIT'( "I<(HI((H5?H56EG(   	 (11) 
with W  	+-# 0 +,  +-  
 
This leads us directly to Proposition 1. 
Proposition 1: If W @  full delegation is optimal. If partial delegation is optimal, the less 
productive task is delegated.  
                                                            
2 Note that I'(I<(HI(( X   needs to hold for task   to be optimally delegated as will be shown in Proposition 1. 
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Whenever W as defined above is positive, (10) is positive and full delegation is preferred to 
partial delegation. While W @  is sufficient for full delegation to be preferred, it is not a 
necessary condition. Rather, with W U  all we require is    to be sufficiently high for (10) 
to be positive as well. Moreover, Proposition 1 implies that W needs to be negative for partial 
delegation to be optimal. Thus, if partial delegation is optimal at all, according to (11) the 
less productive task is optimally delegated to the agent. 
To build some intuition for the above results it helps to relate W to the previously discussed 
optimal risk allocation rate  BC Note that W @  is equivalent to  BC @ . Thus whenever 
the optimal risk allocation rate is above a threshold of  , full delegation is preferred. This 
finding results from two aspects developed earlier in this paper. First, with full delegation, 
effort motivation via   is more effective than with partial delegation and thus the optimal 
incentive rate is always higher with full delegation. Second, if the optimal risk allocation rate   BC is high, full delegation leads to less distortion from the optimum as opposed to partial 
delegation. As a result full delegation is favorable for  BC  (or W) sufficiently high. Likewise, 
with partial delegation the optimal incentive rate is lower than with full delegation which is 
in line with the principal’s risk sharing objectives if he wants to shield the agent from too 
much risk. Accordingly, partial delegation is preferred if  BC (or W) is sufficiently low.  
If partial delegation is preferred at all, the principal always performs the more productive 
task himself. To see this, recall that the agent’s effort equals     Q  at the optimum and 
the principal’s equilibrium effort is characterized by J   0  QJ . For partial 
delegation  BC U   needs to hold which implies  Q U    from (8) and (11). With  Q U   it 
follows that the principal’s effort incentives are higher than the agent’s whenever partial 
delegation is used. As this is the case, it is optimal for the principal to delegate the less 
productive task and to perform the more productive one personally. 
Finally, glance once more at (10). While the productivity of the delegated task, , is relevant 
for full or partial delegation to be preferred, the productivity of the non-delegated task, J, 
affects the absolute size of the difference. No matter whether full or partial delegation is 
preferable, the difference is increasing in J. In fact the higher J the lower the optimal 
incentive rate  Q and the higher the incentives the principal provides himself with. This 
increases the profitability of partial delegation if  BC is sufficiently low but decreases it if  BC is high and full delegation is optimal. 
 
 
VI. Delegation and the congruity of performance measures  
 
In this section we focus on the value of delegation when risk sharing between the 
contracting parties is irrelevant and agency costs arise only from limited congruity of the 
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performance measure. To do so we assume that both contracting parties are risk-neutral. 
Inserting  +-  +,   into the solutions from section 4 we obtain the following results.  
 
 L        
 
and   Q  M'I'M<(HM(( 
 
Both incentive rates are positive and can be below or above one. Of course  L 0  Q    still 
holds. 
With respect to the difference in objective function values we obtain  
 
AL 0 AQ   IT'MT'JIT'( M'(M<(HM((                    (12) 
 
and    AQ 0 AJQ   IT'( M'(JI'(MT'(M<(HM((                                         (13) 
 
From (13) we derive the necessary and sufficient condition for task  to be optimally 
delegated in the case of partial delegation as stated in Proposition 2. 
 
Proposition 2: For  AQ 0 AJQ  , that is task   rather than O   is optimally delegated,  M'MT'  I'IT'  holds.  
 
Proof: See the Appendix. 
 
The relation provided in Proposition 2 holds for one of the two tasks only. If  M'MT'  I'IT' holds 
true the principal prefers to delegate task  whereas the delegated task can be the more or 
the less sensitive task. If,  e.g.    M'MT'  I'IT'  holds, the less productive task is delegated as  I'IT' U  holds. With  M'MT'  I'IT'   the more productive task is delegated. 
 
Assuming that task  is the one to be delegated, the principal uses (12) in order to decide 
whether full delegation or partial delegation is optimal. A necessary and sufficient condition 
is presented in Proposition 3. 
 
Proposition 3: The principal prefers partial delegation over full delegation only if  M'MT'  	 I'IT' 
holds. 
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Proof: The proof follows directly from (12). 
 
Corollary 1 follows immediately from Proposition 3. 
 
Corollary 1: If the performance measure is perfectly congruent the principal prefers full 
delegation to partial delegation.  
For a performance measure to be perfectly congruent  M'MT'  I'IT' needs to hold such that the 
condition M'MT'  	 I'IT' will be violated. 
With a perfectly congruent performance measure in place, first best is achieved with full 
delegation. In fact the principal can choose   such that        BC  and        BC by using   I<M<  I(M(.  
In contrast first best can never be achieved with partial delegation.  Rather, an incentive rate   I'M'  is required to provide the agent with first best effort incentives such that      . To provide a similar equilibrium effort for the principal, however, J  J 0 J  J   requires    . Accordingly, with partial delegation first best cannot be 
achieved even if a perfectly congruent performance measure is present and thus agency 
costs occur. 
This observation provides the starting point for a broader interpretation of our results.  
With full delegation the principal controls both efforts in identical fashion when determining 
the incentive rate  . An increase in the rate increases both efforts in equilibrium while a 
decrease reduces them at a similar rate. He is able to affect the overall amount of effort 
provided but the relation of effort,  &<&(, remains constant. In contrast with partial delegation 
the principal cannot motivate additional effort in one task without decreasing incentives in 
the other one. Thus the principal can control the relation of efforts but cannot increase or 
decrease both of them.  
Whether full or partial delegation is preferred in a particular setting depends on what is 
more effective in reducing agency costs: A delegation mode that motivates both efforts 
simultaneously in the sense of scaling or one that is able to affect relative incentives. 
Intuitively, scaling helps to move effort towards first best, if the sensitivity of both tasks is 
either too low or too high as opposed to their productivities. In contrast if the sensitivity of 
one task is too low while the one of the other task is too high being able to align opposing 
incentives appears  to be useful. 
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Formally the optimal second best effort is chosen to minimize the gap to first best effort in 
each delegation mode. To see this note that according to Pythagoras’ Theorem the distance 
between first and second best effort equals  
Y ZBC 0 [C  BC 0 [C . 
While  BC   from Lemma 1,  [C is determined according to (4), (5), and (6) for the 
different modes of delegation. 
Minimizing Y we obtain the results presented in Lemma 5. 
Lemma 5: The minimum distance from first best equals  
   YL \I(M<JI<M((M<(HM((  with full delegation and  
   YQ I'MT'\M<(HM(( with partial delegation of task  
Proof: See the Appendix. 
Now comparing the minimum distances for the different modes of delegation reestablishes 
the conditions identified in Proposition 2 and 3. In fact  
YQ YJQ   holds if and only if  M'MT'  I'IT' and  
YQ YL holds if  M'MT'  	 I'IT' applies.3 
To provide further intuition for the line of reasoning above we use the following example: 
  ]   	   ^  	 
It follows that   L  	_ L  	_ L  	^` 
     Q  ]^ Q  ` Q  a with delegation of task 1  
  and  Q  _a Q  	^] Q  `` with delegation of task 2. 
Note that inserting into the conditions identified in Proposition 2 and 3 we obtain 
                                                            
3 In fact YLis equal to bYQ 0 YQ b. Thus, full delegation is optimal wheneverbYQ 0 YQ b U c7YQ YQ8. If YQ YQ  
the condition becomes YQ 0 YQU YQ  or YQU 	YQ . For YQ YQ  the condition becomes YQ 0 YQU YQ  or YQU 	YQ . 
This is why the factor “2” in the optimality condition from Proposition 3 shows up. 
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M(M<  a3cd I(I<  e. 
Thus M(M<  I(I< as well as M(M<  	 I(I< hold and the principal optimally delegates task 2 only. 
Depicting the optimal pairs of effort derived above in the f plane allows to compare the 
three modes with regard to Y 
 
 
Figure 1: Scaling versus alignment 
The graphs indicated as FD, PD1, and PD2 denote the combinations of effort that can be 
induced by the principal varying the incentive rate   for full delegation, delegation of task 1, 
and delegation of task 2, respectively.   denote the optimal combinations with 
superscript D indicating a delegated effort.  
Calculating Y)in our example results in  YQ 	_ YQ a_ YL 	]a 
Note that under partial delegation of task 2 the principal minimizes Y Z 0  0     0   =Z    0   . The second term in 
brackets is minimized for     as      	. The first term is minimized for    
First best obviously cannot be achieved but using   Q  _a we get fairly close. 
In contrast, if the first task is delegated the principal minimizes  Y Z    0   .  As   is large in our example compared to   a high 
incentive rate of   g would be required to motivate first best effort in task 1. Again    
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would achieve first best effort with regard to the non-delegated task. The optimal incentive 
rate of  Q  ]^ inevitable leads to a massive downward distortion of effort with respect 
to the delegated task which produces agency costs. As a result the principal prefers to 
delegate task 2 rather than task one.  
Comparing delegation of task 2 to full delegation, note that in the latter case the principal 
minimizes  Y Z 0     0  . With regard to the first term in brackets the 
argument from above applies. Due to high  and low  a high incentive rate would be 
required to motivate first best in task 1. At the same time a more moderate incentive of    would implement first best with regard to task 2. Even though the difference in 
individually optimal  ) is lower than with delegation of task 1 it is far higher than with 
delegation of task 2 and partial delegation is preferred to full delegation. 
  
VII. Concluding remarks  
In this paper we consider a principal who needs to delegate at least one of the two tasks to 
be performed in a firm to an agent. While full delegation is possible, no delegation is not. 
The principal needs to specify contractually which task(s) to delegate and offers an incentive 
contract to the agent. Due to non-contractibility of firm value the contract needs to be based 
on a performance measure that is positively correlated to firm value. Allowing for risk averse 
players in this setting two types of agency problems arise in our setting. A risk-incentive 
problem results from possible suboptimal allocation of risk between principal and agent 
along with distorted incentives. A congruity problem occurs due to the use of a not fully 
congruent performance measure. Both types of problems affect the optimal mode of 
delegation. In order to disentangle overlapping effects from both problems we analyze them 
separately in this paper.  
Focusing on the risk and incentive trade-off, and assuming a fully congruent performance 
measure to do so, we find that partial delegation can only be favorable if the optimal 
exposure to risk of the agent is sufficiently low. If the principal prefers partial delegation he 
always delegates the less productive task. This is straightforward as low risk exposure and 
low incentives are imposed on the agent by a low incentive rate. In contrast, a low rate 
motivates high effort of the principal. Thus, if from a risk sharing perspective a low rate is 
desirable, it makes sense to delegate the task that is less productive. 
To analyze the congruity problem we refrain from any risk aversion. Doing so, we find that 
partial delegation allows the principal to align effort incentives in the sense that he can 
motivate the optimal relation of efforts but not the optimal level. As opposed to that with 
full delegation the principal controls the level but not the relation of efforts. It hinges on the 
relation of effort sensitivities to effort productivities whether scaling or alignment allows to 
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minimize agency costs. The higher the sensitivity of one task relative to the other the more 
favorable it is for the principal to delegate this task only. 
Trying to look at combined effects we find that high risk aversion of the principal and a 
performance measure that is characterized by both tasks either more or less sensitive to the 
performance measure as compared to firm value work in favor of full delegation.  
High risk aversion of the agent relative to the principal and a performance measure that is 
highly sensitive to one task and remotely sensitive to the other as compared to productivity 
render partial delegation more attractive.   
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Appendix 
Proof of Lemma 1: 
The principal’s problem in the first-best solution is  
9:;&<&(= A  .
 0  0  0 5? 23+!)" 0 56 23+!
 0 )"                   (A1) 
With 5? 23+!)"  56 23+!
 0 )"  5?    56 !    0 	# "  (A1) can 
be written as  
9:;&<&(= A    0 

	 0 

	 0 +
,
	   0 +
-
	 !    0 	# " 
From the first-order conditions h iji&<   iji&(   iji=  k we obtain BC  ,  BC   BC  56lm=EG(5?H56  56EFDEG5?H56 and the principal’s first-best surplus is 
ABC  !56H5?"!I<(HI(("J56EF(!JD("J565?EF(56H5? . 
Proof of Lemma 2:  
In the second-best solution under full delegation the principal maximizes (A1) subject to     ,   . By inserting the incentive constraints into the objective function we 
obtain the following problem 
9:;= A      0      0 5?   0 56     0 	# . 
From the first-order condition iji=     0     0 +,  0 +-!  0#"   we obtain  L  M<I<HM(I(HD56EFEGM<(HM((HEG(56H5?    with a corresponding principal surplus of 
AL   I(M(!I<M<H56DEFEG"HI<(M<(HI((M((J!M<(HM(("56EF(HM<I<56DEFEGJEF(EG(N56"(!JD("H5?56%M<(HM((HEG(56H5?  
 
 
Proof of Lemma 3: 
In the second-best solution under partial delegation of task  the principal maximizes (A1) 
subject to    ,J  J 0  J. By inserting the incentive constraints, the principal’s 
objective function obtains as  
9:;= A    0 JJ  J 0    0  J 0  J 0 5?   0 56    0 	#  . 
From the first-order condition iji=   0 JJ 0    JJ 0  J 0 +,  0+-!  0 #"   it follows  
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 Q    #+-    +-  +, 
and AQ   I((NM'(HEG(!5?H56"RHI'(M'(HIT'( MT'( J!M<(HM(("56EF(HM'I'56DEFEGJEF(EG(N56"(!JD("H5?56%M<(HM((HEG(56H5?  
 
Proof of Proposition 2: 
For  AQ 0 AJQ   to hold  
M'MT'  I'IT'                                             (1A) 
needs to hold. If the latter holds,   
MJ'M'  IJ'I'                                                (2A) 
will not hold simultaneously. 
To see that, note that   M'MT'  I'IT' n  IT'I'  MT'M'   which contradicts (2A).  
 
Proof of Lemma 5: 
Note that using  Pythagoras’ Theorem we can define the distance between first best and 
second best efforts as follows:  
 Y ZBC 0 [C  BC 0 [C 
With partial delegation we obtain  
Y \! 0 [C"  J 0 J[C        (A3) 
and  [C     and  J[C  J 0  J. 
Solving the latter equation for   and inserting into the former we get 
[C!J[C"  M'MT' !J 0 J[C"      (A4) 
Inserting into (A3) results in 
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Y op 0 M'MT' !J 0 J[C"q
  J 0 J[C.     (A5) 
 
Deriving the first order condition for a minimum and solving for J[C we obtain: 
 J[C  J 0  M<M(M<(HM((. 
And from (A4)      
[C     
 
 
Inserting this result into (A5) we finally obtain YQ I'MT'\M<(HM((. 
With full delegation we need to minimize 
Y  Z 0 [C   0 [C        (A6) 
with  [C     for   	 
Solving [C    for   and inserting into [C    we get 
[C[C  M<M( [C        (A7) 
Inserting into (A6) we get 
Y  \r 0 M<MT( [Cs   0 [C.       (A8) 
 
Deriving the first order condition for a minimum and solving for [C we obtain: 
 
[C        
And from (A7)      
[C        
 
 
Inserting this result into (A6) we obtain  YL ZI(M<JI<M((\M<(HM(( . 
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